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The crisis in Ukraine of 2014 produced considerable change in the EU international environment, which not 
only tested its capabilities to react very quickly and adequately but also actually destroyed previous subtle 
balance of its Member States in relations with Russia. The EU Member States were not able to continue to 
maintain in these relations the “disunity” pattern, which was successfully described in the European Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations study “A Power Audit of EU – Russia Relations” already in 2007. New turbulence 
pushed EU member states closer together, re-introduced old geopolitical constraints and concerns about 
national and international security and limited the room for diplomatic maneuver and finally produce new 
“unity” pattern. However nature of that new pattern remains not yet fully investigated from academic point 
of view. The aim of the article is to present results of analysis of this shift in foreign policy preferences of the 
EU and its Member States. The research is targeted to identify the nature of this change, which happened 
through process of adjustment to new reality, in the hierarchy of foreign policy preferences of Member 
States and finally of the European Union in general. The aim of the paper will be achieved by implemen-
tation of analysis of collected empirical data on foreign policy preferences of the EU Member States. The 
analysis will be based on typical methods of foreign policy analysis. Those include analysis of legal acts, 
statements of politicians, analytical literature and interviews with experts from the EU Member States. 
The conclusion of the article is supposed to answer to the main research question and to explain nature 
of new choices in the EU Members States foreign policies and its effect to the EU foreign policy towards 
Russia in general.
KEYWORDS: European Union, Foreign Policy, Member States, Russia, Foreign Policy Preferences.
The European Union’s common foreign policy is often an object of criticism, sometimes even out-
right ridicule. Yet to the wonder of many, with the heightened state of crisis in the Ukraine, the 
EU’s response in terms of Russia has been its strongest yet. The EU implemented a whole se-
ries of diplomatic démarches and even applied economic sanctions and restrictions to Russia. 
Below is a description of these measures made by the EU External Action Service: “In response 
to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and continuing destabilization of Ukraine - including ag-
gression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil - the EU has suspended talks on visas and 
a new EU-Russia agreement. Most EU-Russia cooperation programmes have been suspended. 
Targeted measures have been taken against Russia in areas including: access to capital markets, 
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defence, dual-use goods, sensitive technologies (including those in the energy sector). The Europe-
an Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have suspended 
the signing of new financing operations in Russia. A trade and investment ban is now in force for 
Crimea/Sevastopol, bolstering measures taken to mark the EU’s non-recognition of the annex-
ation of Crimea. Furthermore, a number of individuals and bodies in Russia and Ukraine are subject 
to travel bans, and their assets have been frozen” (European Union External Action, 2015).
Earlier, this kind of general agreement by all the EU countries was unimaginable. It became obvi-
ous that something had changed in the EU common foreign policy formation mechanism, that a 
new structure emerged which is now the object of special research and commentary. 
In actual fact, EU and Russian relations were never short of attention. However traditionally it 
has been the so-called “low politics” themes which have received the most attention, i.e., trade, 
visa regimes, scientific and cultural exchanges, transport, energy, which gradually “shifted” from 
the business into the geopolitical sphere once Vladimir Putin consolidated his power. Meanwhile 
in the field of “high politics”, in its relations with Russia the EU was never a serious player. And 
one of the main reasons for this situation has been the variety in EU Member States’ attitudes 
towards Russia and their prospective relations with the country, a point which has been spotted 
numerous times by a majority of observers and researchers. Some member states view Putin’s 
Russia’s development vectors negatively, considering it an obvious turn towards dictatorship 
in the country’s interior and a sign of aggression in its foreign policy. Others thought that de-
spite Russia’s internal domestic development problems, it would still be possible to engage in 
successful and profitable cooperation with the country. Ultimately, this was determined by the 
non-existence of a common EU position and favourable conditions for Russia whereby it could 
have relations not with a unified block, but with separate states.
In 2007 researchers of the think-tank “European Council on Foreign Relations (further – ECFR)” 
who examined this problem prepared an influential study “A Power Audit of EU – Russia Relations” 
(Leonard, Popescu, 2007), which is still being widely cited. The researchers not only analyzed the 
situation, they also provided specific recommendations for a common EU strategy in regards to 
Russia. However this study received most attention not due to its recommendations which have 
now lost some of their relevance, but more for the successful classification of EU Member State 
attitudes towards Russia into five groups: “We have identified five distinct policy approaches to 
Russia shared by old and new members alike: ‘Trojan Horses’ (Cyprus and Greece) who often de-
fend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; ‘Strategic 
Partners’ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which 
occasionally undermines common EU policies; ‘Friendly Pragmatists’ (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close rela-
tionship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals; ‘Frosty Pragma-
tists’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak 
out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues; and ‘New Cold Warriors’ (Lithuania 
and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to 
block EU negotiations with Russia” (Leonard, Popescu, 2007). 
Although the images used to identify the EU state groups were more literary than scientific, they, 
especially the ‘Trojan Horse’ metaphor, gradually became almost a political science category de-
scribing the specific policies of smaller states in power games with the larger players. For example, 
in the context of the current crisis in Ukraine, there have been numerous discussions in the global 
press suggesting that the public expressions of good will towards Russia made by the leaders of 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are a sign that the ‘Trojan Horses’ group is growing no-
ticeably larger (bne IntelliNews, 2015; Bai, 2015; Mudde, 2014; Marušiak, 2013; Liedekerke, 2014).
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Indeed, the differences in EU Members States and their policy approaches towards Russia have 
mostly been and continue to be widely researched, as, most likely, based on them we can give the 
most convincing explanation as to why the EU does not have a common strategy or a consistent 
policy when it comes to Russia (Forbrig, 2015). Precisely they receive the most discussion, as 
mass media records and widely disseminates all the controversial declarations made by state 
leaders, which go on to serve as an expression of these differences of the member states. 
This has ultimately created a kind of inertia in thinking, which interprets the never-seen before uni-
fied stance taken by EU member states in terms of Russia as if it were a temporary coincidence, like 
an exception to the rule, or like a decision that will shortly be reversed and we will soon revert to our 
usual disharmony in interests. This might be why the very fact of the formation and stability of the 
unified EU position has not received a greater deal of attention or more comprehensive discussion. 
Indeed, the mentioned ECFR, which since 2010 has carried out consistent monitoring of the be-
haviour of EU member states also presents its assessments of state uniformity regarding one 
or another foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, the observed increase in the degree of uniformity 
of EU states regarding Russia in 2014 has not yet been more comprehensively interpreted. The 
compilers of the mentioned report, understandably, raising for themselves other, broader objec-
tives, made the following comment on the increased uniformity in EU member states behaviour 
regarding the introduction of sanctions against Russia: “Germany, not itself a strong proponent 
of harsh sanctions, was the clear leader in consolidating a common sanctions policy, especial-
ly after mid-summer. The European Commission was key in preparing a package of sanctions 
acceptable to major member states. Others states that pushed hard for sanctions (often despite 
heavy costs) included Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, UK, and the Baltic States. 
France deserves recognition for halting the sale of Mistral warships. Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, and 
Spain were reluctant to sign on to sanctions, but eventually agreed….” (ECFR, 2015a). 
Naturally, no larger doubts arise regarding the substantiation of such an explanation with facts or 
events. However, in any case, in our view it is too laconic. That is why in this article the goal is to 
take a more in-depth look at how and why the mentioned configuration evolved from the earlier 
complete dissonance of EU state policies regarding Russia.
The article seeks to give a more comprehensive explanation as to how it was possible for the EU 
to achieve this unprecedented degree of unity and to shape to a larger extent the tougher face of 
European foreign policy against Russia.
In light of this goal, answers to the following more detailed questions had to be found:
 _ Why did some states push for sanctions de-
spite (sometimes heavy) costs?
 _ Why did Germany become a leader?
 _ Why did France sacrifice its sale of war-
ships?
 _ Why did some states eventually agree de-
spite initial reluctance? 
The analysis will be based on typical methods of foreign policy analysis. These methods embrace 
critical examination of the foreign policy behaviour of state and other international actors by 
monitoring of the interplay between domestic and external forces; review of the organization, 
psychology and politics of decision-making; analysis of the impact of leadership upon foreign 
policy and the impact of public opinion and state type upon foreign policy, etc. However in this 
particular case, due to the limited size of the article, a lesser amount of methods will be used. 
These include the analysis of legal acts, statements of politicians, analytical literature and al-
ready-published reports by experts from the EU member states. 
The conclusion of the article is supposed to answer the main research question and to explain 
the nature of new choices in the EU member states’ foreign policies and its effect on EU foreign 
policy towards Russia in general.
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But before starting to discuss the decisions by separate EU member states and their groups to 
support sanctions against Russia, another circumstance, the most important one to have urged 
this change, should be mentioned. And that is Russia’s stroke of revisionism which brought about 
this entire process. Russia became more than just a state which decided to disregard the rules of a 
democratic political system common to Europe (free elections, the rule of law, freedom of speech, 
respect for minority rights, etc.), but also found unacceptable European rules for order and security 
that became established after the Cold War that were based on states’ rights to independently decide 
on their development vectors, the refusal to resort to force, and the inviolability of state borders. 
Yet at the same time it should be noted that in any case, Russia’s requirement to give it special 
rights and the respective power and treachery policy in terms of its neighbours was just an ex-
ternal factor which only encouraged the formation process of a unified EU response, though did 
not unilaterally determine the actual shape of that EU response. In order for the emergence of 
a common, note, common not fragmented, EU position, each of the states had to “go down” a 
certain path towards reaching a final decision, until their reaction reached its current status.
“Hawks” – 
consistent 
criticism of 
Russia
It has been the Baltic States, Poland and Romania that have had the least distance “to go”, due 
to their historic experience of Russian aggression. That is why these countries view Russia’s 
increasing aggression or even more so, its success in Ukraine, as a zero-sum game that poses 
an actual existential threat.
Looking from their position, Russia’s actions in Ukraine should receive an unambigiously criti-
cal assessment. Estonia’s president Tomas Hendrik Ilves was one of the first EU heads of state 
to compare the annexation of Crimea to Nazi Germany’s annexation of Sudetenland in 1938 
(Ilves, 2014). Lithuania’s president Dalia Grybauskaitė in November, 2014 repeated several 
times her assessment of Russia’s threat as a terrorist state. On November 21 during a joint 
press conference with the NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, she said: “…We can all 
see that our neighbour, Ukraine’s neighbour, is behaving in a way that neighbours should not 
behave, or as a state that places importance on international law and international responsibil-
ities, as well as agreements it has itself signed. We can see that the Russian military, Russian 
soldiers are today present in eastern Ukraine, meanwhile that same state is openly lying in 
denying this. A state which orders its soldiers to remove their identification symbols, which 
brings in its army and heavy artillery without any identification symbols – this kind of state 
bears all the hallmarks of international terrorism. That’s all I can say…” (Alkas.lt, 2014). 
That is why these states urge the European Union to also take up a maximally strict stance and 
react to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and they are convinced that the EU’s response has not been 
sufficiently decisive, strict or effective. The Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius 
has publically voiced this position. Ahead of a two-day informal meeting of European Union Foreign 
Ministers on 6-7 March, 2015 in Riga, the minister, in his assessment of the situation that had de-
veloped in Ukraine following the signing of the Minsk Agreement, claimed to journalists that: “Being 
unified is all well and good, everyone is all for this unison, but being united not to do anything is not 
for me. I don’t like that. We must be unified in actually doing something” (BNS, 2015). 
As is widely known, the Baltic States and Russia are linked via important economic ties. Russia 
is a significant market and energy resource provider for the Baltic States. On the other hand, 
even before the Ukraine crisis, Russia used economic and energy pressure measures as a way 
of applying political pressure on numerous occassions, to the extent that these countries have 
gradually had to “learn” and become used to living without Russia’s market, and to accelerate 
their efforts in diversifying their energy resource providers. However, in the face of the existen-
tial threat posed by Russia, it is obvious that these dependencies lose their primary significance 
and do not interrupt these countries from wholeheartedly supporting EU sanctions. 
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In their rhetoric on Russia, Poland’s leaders have been somewhat more reserved than their col-
leagues in the Baltic countries. However their position on the necessity of applying EU sanctions 
on Russia and of making them stricter if the peace agreements are not abided, plus the further 
escalation of the conflict, has been decisively strict (Reuters, 2014). Expressing its concern over 
the possible destabilization of the entire region, Romania demonstrated complete support for the 
application of EU sanctions on Russia as well (Chiriac, 2014).
Countries which have a different historical background, such as Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands, 
are also among the unconditional backers of EU sanctions. The primary motive uniting them is their 
disappointment in Russia. They hold a very critical and skeptical view of contemporary Russia’s 
development trajectory and believe that the time has come to exert pressure to stop its slide down 
this path. For example, UK and Russian relations took an obvious turn for the worse one decade ago 
and have remained rather cold to this day. That is why UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s critique 
of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine was one of the most categorical and unambigiously supported a 
broad as possible application of sanctions and their further strengthening (Gross, Bryan-Low, 2015). 
The opposition Labour Party leaders also in effect approve of this position.
Sweden’s strict position has primarily been determined by the conservative government whose 
foreign policy has been influenced by the consistent critic of the Russian regime and initiator of 
the European Eastern Partnership, Carl Bildt (Gardels, 2014). The significant increase in Rus-
sian military activity in the Baltic Sea region has also notably contributed to Sweden’s position. 
Public opinion is also in favour of this kind of stance. The possibility of becoming a NATO mem-
ber is also receiving more serious consideration in Sweden as well. The Social-Democrats who 
came to power after the elections in October, 2014 have not strived to change the country’s 
strict position, perhaps only tempering certain accents in the recent rhetoric.
An exception in this group is the Netherlands, which basically had no historic or geopolitical 
problems with Russia and has always first sought to develop profitable economic relations with 
it. Critical comments over the state of democracy or the human rights situation in Russia from 
the pragmatic Dutch governments have similarly not been forthcoming. Of course, the crude 
infringements of international law that Russia made in 2014 could not go by unnoticed, howev-
er the Netherlands were not inclined to stand out, much less end up in the group of countries 
expressing most criticism of Russia. In their view, it would have completely sufficed to simply 
follow the initiative shown by the German leadership, while the sanctions could have been more 
symbolic than fundamental (Togt, 2015). 
The change in the Netherlands’ position was fated by the accident when on July 17, 2014 the 
Malaysian Airlines plane was brought down above eastern Ukraine, on route from Amsterdam 
to Kuala Lumpur. During the attack 283 passengers and 15 crew members were killed. Among 
the close to 300 dead, two thirds were Dutch citizens. This catastrophe fundamentally changed 
Dutch society’s approach towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The government too could not ig-
nore this change, and came to understand that regular diplomacy would not be enough to control 
this particular conflict. As such, contrary to their plans, the Netherlands became a supporter of 
stricter sanctions against Russia.
German 
Leadership 
and French 
Sacrifice
Germany’s leadership has been without a doubt the most significant change which has led to 
the common European Union position gaining solid support. Keeping in mind the hitherto hard-
fought and patiently nurtured special relations between Russia and Germany, the turnaround 
from the summer of 2014 was very important. How and why did it eventuate?
As is known, until quite recently Germany was first and foremost an economic power that avoid-
ed playing a more distinctive role in foreign and security policy. And this was a rather comfortable 
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position, allowing it to concentrate its attention on economic and social issues, and to develop 
relatively politically neutral yet economically beneficial and profitable ties with Russia.
On the other hand, the fact that Germany has started to acquire a more obvious foreign policy 
profile was noted by observers and experts even before the apogee of the Ukraine crisis. Ac-
cording to the Strafor analysis: “As the de facto leader of the European Union, Germany has to 
contend with and correct the slow failure of the European project. It has to adjust to the U.S. policy 
of global disengagement, and it must manage a complex, necessary and dangerous relationship 
with Russia. A meek foreign policy is not well suited to confront the situation in which Germany 
now finds itself. If Germany doesn’t act, then who will? And if someone else does, will it be in 
Germany’s interest?” (Friedman, Lanthemann, 2014).
Having this in mind, it is much easier to understand why, alongside factors such as the difficulties in 
European integration, the relative “standing back” of the USA and Russia’s revisionism, Germany in 
actual fact was left with no other choice but to take up the leadership role and fundamentally influ-
ence the hitherto poorly articulated common European Union policy in terms of Russia.
Subjective factors have also contributed significantly to these objective circumstances. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel went to considerable effort to convince Putin to uphold a different pol-
icy in regards to Ukraine and to reject plans for the annexation of Crimea. However the breaking 
point came in the early days of March, 2014. According to a correspondent from the New York 
Times “Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany told Mr. Obama by telephone on Sunday that after 
speaking with Mr. Putin she was not sure he was in touch with reality, […] “In another world,” she 
said.” (Bakermarch, 2014).
This “miscommunication” between Merkel and Putin became a determining factor that helped 
change both Germany’s public opinion, as well as the business community’s position in terms of 
Russia. As Russia continued to escalate the conflict in Ukraine, support for sanctions grew ac-
cordingly. If in March only 24% of surveyed respondents were in favour of sanctions, then by June 
this figure had grown to 52%, and 54% by September (Wehner, 2014). Regardless of the sanc-
tion-related losses (export to Russia decreased by 26%), Merkel managed to win over Germany’s 
business community to join her side (Pond, Kundnani, 2015).
Finally, bolstered by her support at home, the chancellor convinced the other European Union 
states that forcible alteration of country borders needs to be opposed in principle, and that such 
actions cannot go by without recourse. Even if certain losses need to be experienced as a result.
In this context, France’s position was particularly important. Unlike Germany, France’s economic 
ties with Russia are much less developed, which is why the introduction of sanctions against Rus-
sia was felt to a much lesser degree than in Germany. However the crisis in Ukraine and its ever 
increasing escalation has become difficult to coordinate politically with the contract signed with 
Russia back in 2011 for the construction and sale of two Mistral warships valued at €1.2 billion. The 
French president François Hollande, despite trying to maintain the position that the EU sanctions 
and the transfer of the warships had nothing in common, in November, 2014 nevertheless made an 
announcement about the suspension of the contract “until further notice” (BBC, 2014).
France’s decision to delay the sale of the warships, even though this contract did not figure 
amongst the restrictions foreseen as part of the sanctions, did bring France and Germany notice-
ably closer together, while also strengthening the central position of both states in the European 
Union, as well as its united policy regarding Russia. The common position of Germany and France 
helped bring the sides involved in fighting in Ukraine to the negotiating table in Minsk in February, 
2015 and reach a new agreement for peace.
This closeness of Germany and France and their decision to act together undoubtedly strength-
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ened and safeguarded the possibility of successfully leading the European Union. Of course, today 
Germany alone is already capable of leading the European Union forward and to act as a leader 
in common EU policy. However, this leadership would have been much less fathomable if France 
had not indefinitely delayed and thus associated the transfer of the Mistral warships to Russia with 
regulation of the conflict in Ukraine, that is, if France’s president had not gone together with Merkel 
to participate in the peace negotiations in Minsk. According to ECFR researcher Josef Janning: “The 
tandem has entered a new stage, in which both possess leadership resources, albeit in different 
policy areas, but in which leadership is not clearly allocated – sometimes it is shared, at other 
times lost for lack of strategic consensus. Also, the relationship still seems to depend highly on the 
chemistry between leaders, which makes it less stable and predictable. It took over two years and 
three profound challenges for Merkel to reconnect strategically with Hollande. Now, the pairing is 
back and seems determined to lead – but for how long?” (Janning, 2015).
Indeed, at the same time we should draw attention to the fact that although the researcher com-
ments on the existence of a new quality of relations between France and Germany, he neverthe-
less ends his thought with the rhetorical question about the sustainability of this new tandem.
Researchers in Finland notice a different aspect of the quality of this new leadership. According to 
them, this distinctive role of Germany and France is at the one time beneficial and features potential 
shortcomings, as it does not make sufficient use of the EU’s own institutions that could have a more 
clearly defined mandate to negotiate on behalf of all the EU, more so than just Germany and France 
have now (Raik, 2015). Indeed, as we might have well noticed, the EU institution leadership newly 
appointed in 2014 (President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the 
European Council Donald Tusk and even the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
Federica Mogherini) have not played a particularly significant role in this instance.
This group includes Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovenia, Croatia, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Malta and Ireland. For a majority of the states in this group, Russian relations are not 
among the highest priority issues, neither in an economic sense, much less so in a political 
sense. The non-existence of the main fundamental tensions naturally encourages these states 
not to take a prematurely anti-Russian stance by default. Quite the opposite, they first of all think 
that closer cooperation with Russia could be mutually beneficial. That is why in principle they do 
not oppose but support sanctions against Russia, however they believe that the dialogue should 
continue, and when it becomes evident that Russia is abiding by the agreements, the sanctions 
should be called off. For example, although neither Spain’s economic or political ties with Rus-
sia are particularly wide or close, much less strategic, nevertheless, as the commentator from 
Madrid Nicolás de Pedro says, “for observers of Spanish foreign policy, the question is no longer 
whether Madrid is pro-Russian or not, but why Spain sounds so pro-Russian” (Pedro, 2015). 
According to the same observer, Spain was rather skeptical of the events at Maidan Square and 
once the conflict in Ukraine’s east commenced, it stated that no good would come of it.
Yet the annexation of Crimea was Russia’s move which changed Spain’s position and opinion. 
“However, this firm position, like the one it took on Kosovo’s independence, is primarily shaped 
by Madrid’s concerns about Catalonia and the Basque Country and is completely unrelated to 
Spain’s links with Ukraine or Russia (or Serbia)” (de Pedro, 2015).
Perhaps Finland and Bulgaria are the other two states that stand out from this group, who due to 
their geographical location and extensive economic ties with Russia do feel the outcomes of the 
conflict. Finland’s statehood, much like that of the Baltic States, is based on the same principles 
that were settled on after the Cold War, which Russia is now openly infringing. However, Finland’s 
behaviour is still quite different to the unambigious opinions voiced by the Baltic States. Analysts 
from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs presented a comprehensive comparative anal-
The 
“Neutrals” – 
loyal 
Europeans
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ysis of Finland’s and Estonia’s reactions to the crisis in Ukraine and the motivations for agreeing 
to sanctions. According to them, both countries’ response to the crisis was “similar but different”. 
This contradictive description should be understood as follows, according to the authors: “Estonia 
and Finland took similar positions on many key issues regarding the Ukraine crisis. The common 
ground is based on both countries’ attachment to the liberal world order and Western structures. 
However, there are deep-rooted differences between the Estonian and Finnish positions on the 
way to handle Russia and the need to adjust security arrangements, notably the role of NATO in 
the Nordic-Baltic region. It is common in Finland to see Estonia’s approach as unhelpfully hawk-
ish, and common in Estonia to see Finland’s approach as too accommodating towards Russia” 
(Raik, Aaltola, Pynnöniemi, Salonius-Pasternak, 2015).
In actual fact, Finland, continuing along with the tradition from Cold War times, tried to take up 
a seemingly neutral position and to mediate in the conflict. Finland’s president Sauli Niinistö as 
part of an official visit travelled to Sochi to meet with Putin on August 15, 2014. Yet it is unlikely 
that this would have brought about any conceivable results. 
Bulgaria’s case also depends on the historically traditionally friendly ties it shared with Russia. That 
is why it is not surprising that Bulgaria, unlike Russia’s other former communist neighbours, is not 
such a categorical supporter of sanctions. According to a public opinion poll carried out in Febru-
ary–March, 2015, as many as 61% of Bulgaria’s population does not agree with the sanctions and 
only 24% consider the conflict in Ukraine a threat to Bulgaria’s security. The activities of the “Islamic 
State” and other terrorist groups is considered a much greater threat (ECFR, 2015b).
However the main conclusion from this study was that regardless of Bulgarians’ friendship with 
Russia, they do not consider this country as an example to follow and expectations of greater se-
curity at home or guaranteed economic wellbeing coming from Russia, rather than membership 
in the European Union or NATO, are unfounded (ECFR, 2015b).
That is why Bulgaria naturally ended up amongst those countries that do not themselves recom-
mend tightening sanctions yet do support the common EU policy regarding Russia being formed 
by Germany.
Thus, all the mentioned states took up the same position of “loyal” Europeans, albeit for different 
reasons, and in this way fundamentally contributed to the consolidation of the common EU position.
Besides the traditional ‘Trojan Horses’ of Greece and Cyprus, other countries that also sympa-
thize with Putin, namely Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and to a degree the Czech president 
Miloš Zeman, could also be attributed to this group. The political elites and political leaders of 
these states do not avoid openly criticizing the EU sanctions policy and continue to be in favour 
of even the highest level of political dialogue with Russia.
However at the same time they are characterized by inconsistency, as when they criticize the 
sanctions, they also end up criticizing themselves. Regardless of their rhetoric, the representa-
tives of these countries did not resolve to officially take up a different position in European insti-
tutions or to block the unanimous acceptance of sanctions.1*  
Greece’s new government, which now consists of the leftist populist “Syriza” Party that won in 
the elections on January 25, 2015, has on numerous occasions signalled that it will try to block 
EU sanctions against Russia. Yet this did not happen. The Informal Meeting of EU Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, which was called to discuss the worsening security situation in Ukraine (the 
artillery attack against peaceful citizens in Mariupol on January 24), didn’t change anything in 
this respect. The visit of the new Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras to Moscow on April 8, 2015 
failed to bring any unexpected results, despite raising considerable speculation.
1 This well-directed expression I have found in Gustav Gressel’s text (Gressel, 2015).
“Russland- 
verste-
her’s”1  
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Austria too is not even trying to hide its skeptical approach towards the sanctions applied against 
Russia. It was the first EU country that Putin visited on an official visit after the annexation of 
Crimea on June 24, 2014. The reasons for their skepticism, according to Gustav Gessel, are 
essentially economic, yet there are also numerous provisions in Austria’s own political culture, 
which is not adverse to various informal agreements (Gressel, 2015). Whatever the case might 
be, keeping in mind Germany’s position, Austria was not prepared to transfer its doubts to the 
European level and oppose the common EU sanction policy.
Italian-Russian relations are in effect economic and have nothing in common with geopolitical 
conditions. Russia is one of Italy’s most important energy resource providers and a market for 
Italian goods. Meanwhile Italy’s relations with other East European countries, such as Ukraine for 
example, have always been smaller than minimal. That is why the conflict in Eastern Europe has 
been of interest to Italians only so far as it would not worsen good relations with Russia. 
According to the commentator from Rome, Nathalie Tocci, it was most probably the downing of 
the Malaysian Airlines plane more than the annexation of Crimea or military activity in eastern 
Ukraine which encouraged Italy to review its position and to go along with the common EU posi-
tion (Tocci, 2014). Another commentator says that Italy agrees that Russia violated international 
law, and thus appropriate sanctions must be applied. However this does not mean that further 
dialogue with Russia needs to be completely broken off, or that it should be pushed into diplo-
matic isolation (Francescon, 2015). 
Yet while supporting the sanctions, Italy nevertheless tries to continue to maintain direct political 
contact with Putin and to further develop bilateral political relations with Russia. Already after 
the annexation of Crimea, on July 9, 2014 the then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Federica 
Mogherini visited Moscow. The pretext for the formal visit was the beginning of Italy’s half-year 
presidency of the Council of the European Union. However such an open expression of attention 
to Putin almost cost the minister her chance of becoming the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs. 
Hungary’s pro-Russian policy is neither a new nor an unexpected phenomenon in the Central 
European political landscape. This is in part due to economic ties. Russia extended a loan, 
under favourable rates, worth €10 million to Hungary for the development of an atomic power 
plant (Shchelin, 2015). A greater degree of pro-Russian sentiments come from the specific 
political ideas of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party, which detail 
that Hungary could be “a non-liberal democracy and have a similar political system to that of 
Russia or Turkey”.
That is why explaining why Hungary was not sufficiently consistent and did not try to block 
the sanctions being applied to Russia is not such an easy task. Taking a further, closer look, it 
appears that this pro-Russian stance is more rhetorical than realistic. Hungary cannot ignore 
the position of its main trading partner. Approximately a quarter of Hungary’s foreign trade was 
with Germany. Nevertheless, having considered the advantages that Hungary enjoys being a 
part of the West, they significantly outweigh the temptations that Putin has offered Hungary. As 
the situation is one where a choice must be made, like it or not, Hungary still chooses Europe.
The case of Slovakia is more distinctive. Although the Slovakian government and especially Prime 
Minister Robert Fico are critical of sectoral sanctions against Russia, and because public opinion is 
also divided, realistically the state’s administration goes to obvious lengths to avoid any steps that 
would in any way harm the EU unity already achieved. Moreover, in recent years Slovakia has pur-
posefully tried to reduce its dependence on Russia in all aspects, starting from energy and going all 
the way through to the leftover Soviet defence equipment that is still in use (Kobzova, 2015).
17
European Integrat ion Studies 2015/9
Compared to the audit of EU and Russian relations made in 2007, the present situation of EU 
unity and coordinated policy regarding Russia is much more pronounced. Specifically, current 
relations have taken the form of a stream of diplomatic démarches and legal and economic 
sanctions. The point of this policy approach is also rather evident. 
This, of course, determined the change of the earlier configuration, that could be described as 
such: 
 _ On the one hand, it appears that the group of Russia’s ‘Trojan Horses’ has almost significantly 
increased in size – the traditional pairing of Greece and Cyprus has been joined by Italy and 
Central European countries – Austria, Slovakia and Hungary. On the other hand, thus far there 
are no serious indicators that these countries are in fact ready to justify the label applied to 
them. At least so far, the ‘Trojan Horses’ are inactive, their “loyalty” to Russia has been ex-
pressed only via the rhetoric of individual leaders. So even though they value partnership with 
Russia, it is not to the extent that they would exchange it for European cooperation. For them, 
Russia is a very important supplement to European cooperation. Though only a supplement, 
and not a substitute. If the necessity to choose were to arise, it is more likely that they would 
settle on European solidarity;
 _ The ‘Strategic Partners’ group, we could say, underwent a fundamental change (Italy and Spain 
dropped out), while the remaining France and especially Germany transformed from being 
strategic partners to the architects of a unified EU response, becoming leaders and the main 
EU negotiators in trying to mediate in the regulation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In this con-
text, it should be noted that the rise of these countries’ leaders came mostly at the expense of 
EU institutions;
 _ The composition of the group of ‘Friendly Pragmatists’ changed somewhat. It could be said 
that Austria, Hungary and Slovakia “left” this group, leaving Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia which joined the EU in 2013. Spain maintains a 
similar position, whose declared strategic partnership with Russia never reached any notice-
able acceleration. Ireland and Denmark could also be reservedly added to this group, who have 
not gone out of their way to stand out in this crisis in any real way, and also the Czech Repub-
lic, whose president Zeman’s pro-Russian rhetoric obviously counterbalances the principled 
position of the government. However, most importantly, this group is no longer as “friendly” 
towards Russia. Even though these countries, at least on the official level, try to avoid rhetoric 
that either criticizes or justifies Russia, they have become rather reliable supporters of Germa-
ny’s demonstrated leadership.
 _ That leaves the “Frosty Pragmatists” group, which except for the Czech Republic and Ireland 
which were once members, has now become substantially “more radical”, like the “Cold War-
riors”. The fact that now besides Poland and Lithuania there is also the UK, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the other Baltic States, it has transformed into a relatively important and influen-
tial force, capable of strongly representing its position in internal EU debates.  
Indeed, it is difficult to forecast whether this new configuration shall last for a longer period. This 
will depend on external factors, primarily Russia’s behaviour. However, in any case it can be 
stated that compared to 2007, a rapid return to the earlier situation in terms of relations is hardly 
imaginable, as obviously much time is still needed for the new coexistence of the European 
Union and Russia to form and take on a more distinctive appearance. 
Yet the most important thing that has become evident from this exceptional episode in EU foreign 
policy is that the one-off expression of states’ common position has not gone by without outcomes 
and is itself becoming another significant factor influencing decisions in the foreign policies of sep-
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arate states, and respectively modifying the spectrum of states’ opinion ranges. In this case, the 
European Union is becoming a “normative power” not just to the external world, but in terms of its 
own Member States. On the one hand, this is nothing surprising, however on the other hand, what 
is new is that for the first time the European Union is “steering” its Member States through a field 
transfused with so many complex and counteractive interests, as are relations with Russia. 
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